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BENEFITS AND JUST COMPENSATION IN CALIFORNIA
It often happens that when real property is partially taken in con-
demonation the remaining property is enhanced in fair market value
by the construction of the public improvement. In proper situations,
both the California' and the federal courts2 allow this enhancement
to the remaining land to be offset against the compensation otherwise
awarded the landowner. In California, this is effected by assigning
monetary values to (1) the property taken, called the take, (2) the
damages inflicted on the remaining property due to the taking itself,
called severance damages, and (3) the benefits received by the remain-
ing property resulting from the construction of the improvement.
"Just compensation" is determined by offsetting the benefits against
the severance damages and then adding the value of the take.3
By contrast, in the federal courts, "just compensation" is the dif-
ference between the fair market value of the entire property before
the taking and the fair market value of the remaining property after
the construction of the improvement. Benefits are not given sepa-
rate consideration in this federal "before and after" formula but are
reflected in the award to the extent that they affect the fair market
value of the remaining property.4 This note will compare the Call-
1 See, e.g., Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902).
2 See, e.g., Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
3 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1248: "The court, jury, or referee must hear
such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceed-
ing, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned...
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be con-
demned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned
3. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each
estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of
the improvement proposed by the plaintiffs. If the benefit shall be equal to
the damages assessed under subdivision 2, the owner of the parcel shall be
allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken. If the benefit
shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from
the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition
to the value. If the benefit shall be greater than the damages so assessed,
the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value
of the portion taken, but the benefit shall in no event be deducted from the
value of the portion taken;
7. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source of
damage separately."
4 Aaronson v. United States, 79 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1935). The federal
statute is 33 U.S.C. § 595 (1964): "In all cases where private property shall
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fornia rule and its deficiencies with the federal rule, and will propose
that the federal rule be adopted in California.
The California View
Early Position
California's initial position on the law of benefits was stated in
1866 by the California Supreme Court in San Francisco, Alameda and
Stockton Railroad v. Caldwell.5 The court held that "benefit or ad-
vantage" to the remaining land resulting from the construction of a
public project could be offset against the damages inflicted upon the
landowner by the condemnor.6 The court stated that
[wIhen the land of which he is deprived is a part only of a tract, such
compensation may be ascertained by determining the value of the
whole tract without the improvement and the portion remaining after
the work is constructed. The difference is the true compensation to
which the party is entitled.7
This rule announced by the California court is the "before and after"
rule used in the federal courts today.8 Caldwell was extended seven
years later in California Pacific Railroad Company v. Armstrong,9
where the court allowed the consideration of all possible future en-
hancement in property value, however remote, that the public im-
provement might bring to the landowner's remaining land.10
With railroads the principal users of the power of condemnation
in California during the 1870's, speculative computation of benefits
under the rule of Armstrong and Caldwell" all but eliminated money
as a medium of compensation. These benefits consisted of potential
increases in population, ease of transportation, or hypothesized in-
creases in land values that the railroad was someday to bring to the
landowner's remaining land.12 Such "payments" in offsetting specu-
be taken by the United States for the public use in connection with any im-
provement of rivers, harbors, canals, or waterways of the United States, and
in all condemnation proceedings by the United States to acquire lands or ease-
ments for such improvements, where a part only of any such parcel, lot, or
tract of land shall be taken, the jury or other tribunal awarding the just
compensation or assessing the damages to the owner, whether for the value of
the part taken or for any injury to the part not taken, shall take into con-
sideration by way of reducing the amount of compensation or damages any
special and direct benefits to the remainder arising from the improvement,
and shall render their award or verdict accordingly."
5 31 Cal. 368 (1866).
6 Id. at 373-74.
7 Id. at 376.
S See note 3 supra.
9 46 Cal. 85 (1873).
10 Id. at 91.
11 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMIENT DOMAIN 41-44 (2d
ed. 1953); Yager, Just Compensation, BIGHT OF WAY, Dec. 1964, at 22.
12 See Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902), where
these practices are discussed.
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lative benefits, rather than in cash, caused a reaction that resulted in
an amendment to the California Constitution in 1879.13 This amend-
ment excluded any consideration of benefits in computing compen-
sation to be paid by "corporations" for land that they acquired by
condemnation.
The Present California Rule
Because the 1879 amendment applied only to corporations, rail-
roads were left with a "loophole." By having a "disinterested" indi-
vidual exercise the power of condemnation, then later buying the
condemned property from this private party, the railroads were able
to continue "paying" for property by offsetting overvalued speculative
benefits rather than in cash.14
To close this "loophole," the California Supreme Court, in Beve-
ridge v. Lewis,15 held that only those benefits classified as "special"
could be offset. 6 This rule, the court said, applied to both corpora-
tions and individuals. 17
Benefits are said to be of two kinds, general and special. General
benefits consist in an increase in the value of land common to the
community generally, from advantages which will accrue to the com-
munity from the improvement.... They are conjectural and incap-
able of estimation. They may never be realized, and in such case the
property-owner has not been compensated save by the sanguine prom-
ise of the promoter.
Special benefits are such as result from the mere construction of
the improvement, and are peculiar to the land in question .... 18
The court's intent in drawing this dichotomy clearly was to allow
consideration only of those benefits that would produce a present,
real and estimable increase in the fair market value of the remaining
land.19 In essence, the court correlated the rule of benefits to the
13 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1879) provides: "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first
made to, or paid into court for, the owner, and no right of way ... shall be
appropriated to the use of any corporation . . . other than municipal until
full compensation therefor be first made in money or ascertained and paid
into Court for the owner, irrespective of any benefits from any improvement
proposed by such corporation .... (Emphasis added).
14 See Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902).
15 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902).
16 Id. at 623-24, 70 P. at 1085-86.
17 Id. at 622-23, 70 P. at 1084-85.
18 Id. at 623-24, 70 P. at 1085-86 (emphasis added).
19 Today all but a few jurisdictions draw this distinction. The reason
given is fairness to the landowner. For discussions see 2 J. LEWIs, LAw OF
E~mvENT DOmAiN § 693 (3d ed. 1909); 3 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMIMENT
DoMAn § 8.6205 (rev. 3d ed. 1965); L. ORGEL, VALUATON UNDER THE LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN § 65 (2d ed. 1953). Furthermore, the situations which have
been held to create special benefits are similar under both the California and
federal rules. Compare Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897), with Beveridge
v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902). See also United States v. Crance,
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rule of damages that prevents consideration of future and speculative
injury.20
Having properly eliminated the consideration of speculative bene-
fits, the court then unnecessarily limited the offsetting of special
benefits to severance damage.21 The reason the court excluded the
offsetting of benefits against the value of the take was its fear that
juries would still award inadequate compensation to the condemnee. 22
It is questionable today, however, whether juries favor the condem-
nor-if they ever did-and since benefits in California are an appro-
priate element in computing compensation,23 it is illogical to limit the
consideration and effect to only one segment of the total damage.24
Nonetheless, Beveridge is the law in California today.
A Critical Look at the California Rule
Double Compensation
The California rule unjustifiably favors the landowner by allow-
ing double compensation when the special benefits exceed severance
damages. This double compensation results from breaking the total
damage caused by the condemnation into two elements-damage for
the take and severance damages-and by then offsetting the benefits
only against the severance damages. This means that the owner re-
ceives non-monetary advantage if special benefits exceed severance
damages, in addition to full monetary compensation for the take.
25
Since the benefits and the compensation for the take overlap in this
situation, the landowner receives double compensation. By compari-
son, under the federal rule the benefits are offset against all damage,
thereby eliminating any double compensation.
26
To illustrate, suppose that a highway is constructed across the
341 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1965); Aaronson v. United States, 79 F.2d 139 (D.C.
Cir. 1935); United States v. 1,000 Acres of Land, 162 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. La.
1958); 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 410 (1937).
20 See generally 3 T. SEDGWIcK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 2298 passim (9th
ed. 1912).
21 Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 626, 70 P. 1083, 1086 (1902).
22 3 P. NIcHOLs, THE LAW OF EBMENT DOMA N § 8.6206(1) (rev. 3d ed.
1965).
23 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248; see note 2 supra for text of section 1248.
24 See generally 1 J. BONBEiGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 422 (1937); 1 W.
ELLIOTT, LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS § 274 (4th ed. 1926); 2 J. LEWIS, LAW OF
EMINENT Doi.nw § 693 (3d ed. 1909); 3 P. NicHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT
DoMAIN §§ 8.6-.6206 (rev. 3d ed. 1965); L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW
OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 65 (2d ed. 1953); 3 T. SEDGWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES
2293 (9th ed. 1912).
25 Contra Costa County Water Dist. v. Zuckerman Const. Co., 240 Cal.
App. 2d 908, 50 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1966); People ex rel. Department of Pub.
Works v. Hurd, 205 Cal. App. 2d 16, 23 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1962).
26 United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926);
United States v. Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1965).
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landowner's property, dividing the parcel and taking one-half of its
physical area. Before condemnation, the highest and best use of this
land was for grazing livestock. After the highway is completed,
however, the value of the remaining parcel is enhanced because por-
tions may be leased as service station sites.27 Assume that severance
damages are estimated at $1,000, while special benefits are estimated
to be $15,000. If the fair market value of the land before the taking
were $10,000, the following results would occur under the two differ-
ent rules.
In California, the landowner would be entitled to a total of $5,000,
i.e., the value of the take ($5,000) plus the value of the severance
damage when offset against the value of the special benefits ($1,000 -
$15,000, or zero). Under the federal rule, since the fair market value
of the land before the project was $10,000 and the fair market value
of the remaining land is $24,000, the landowner would receive no
money, but he would own land worth more after the project than be-
27 For other examples where the California courts have found special
benefits, see Contra Costa County Water Dist. v. Zuckerman Const. Co., 240
Cal. App. 2d 908, 50 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1966) (use of underground pipelines
built by the condemnor); People ex tel. Department of Pub. Works v. Ander-
son, 236 Cal. App. 2d 683, 46 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1965) (use of frontage roads);
People ex tel. Department of Pub. Works v. Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 2d
345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1963) (additional land from street abandonment caused
by the project); People ex tel. Department of Pub. Works v. Edgar, 219 Cal.
App. 2d 381, 32 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1963) (potential commercial sites along a
freeway due to construction of an overpass); People ex Tel. Department of
Pub. Works v. Hurd, 205 Cal. App. 2d 16, 23 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1962) (possible
zoning change due to construction of the project); Hayward v. Unger, 194
Cal. App. 2d 516, 15 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1961) (an increased flow of traffic past a
business due to street widening by the condemnor); People v. Thomas, 108
Cal. App. 2d 832, 239 P.2d 914 (1952) (fencing the condemnee's remaining
land after highway improvement); People v. Al. G. Smith, Co., 86 Cal. App.
2d 308, 194 P.2d 750 (1948) (an increase in the highest and best use of the
land due to the project); Los Angeles County v. Marblehead Land Co., 95
Cal. App. 602, 273 P. 131 (1928) (improved access to highway).
For examples held to constitute only general benefits, see Pierpont Inn,
Inc. v. State, 261 A.C.A. 854, 68 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1968) (construction of an off-
ramp in the vicinity of a motel); Dunbar v. Humboldt Bay Mun. Water Dist.,
254 Cal. App. 2d 480, 62 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1967) (increased swimming, fishing,
and fordability of a stream due to construction of a state dam); People ex Tel.
Department of Pub. Works v. Lipari, 213 Cal. App. 2d 485, 28 Cal. Rptr. 808
(1963) (right to be viewed from a newly constructed freeway). The reason-
ing in Lipari is, perhaps, the most bizarre in the California cases on special
benefits. Especially noteworthy is the theory that since the purpose of free-
ways is to transport the population rapidly, this negates any special benefit in
the abutting property which might arise from being seen from the highway.
One wonders, if this is so, why restaurants, motels and service stations pur-
chase such property and why highway billboards are placed there. People v.
McReynolds, 31 Cal. App. 2d 219, 87 P.2d 734 (1939) (realigning a highway on
the condemnee's land).
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fore.28 The landowner suffers no loss under either the California or
federal rule, but in California the condernee receives more than he
has lost. This is not "just" compensation. As the United States Su-
preme Court has stated:
The just compensation required by the Constitution to be made to the
owner is to be measured by the loss caused to him by the appropria-
tion. He is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived
of, and no more. To award him less would be unjust to him; to award
him more would be unjust to the public.29
The Court then summed up the theory of double compensation as
follows:
[I]t is neither just in itself, nor required by the Constitution, that the
owner should be entitled both to receive the full value of the part
taken . . . and to retain the increase in value of the [remaining
land] .30
"Unjust" Compensation
The power of eminent domain is inherent in sovereignty and is
"absolute and unlimited.' 3 1 It is unnecessary, therefore, to have a
constitutional provision authorizing the sovereign to take private
property for the public good, with or without compensation.3 2 Con-
stitutional provisions on eminent domain merely limit the use of this
absolute power in order to balance a countervailing interest.
33
The limitation found in both the United States Constitution and
the California Constitution is that private property shall not be taken
without "just compensation. '3 4 This vague provision obviously re-
quires judicial interpretation. Just compensation, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court, "means a compensation that would
be just in regard to the public as well as in regard to the individual."3 5
The California cases echo this sentiment that the constitutional limi-
tation is to "balance the equities" of the state and the individual.3 6
28 E.g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411
(1926); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); United States v. 2477.79 Acres
of Land, 259 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1958); Aaronson v. United States, 79 F.2d 139
(D.C. Cir. 1935).
29 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 575.
31 1 P. NiCHOLs, THE LAw OF EMMNENT Do1mAw § 1.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1964).
32 Id.
38 Id.
34 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." This is made obligatory on
the states by the fourteenth amendment. See McCoy v. Union E.R.R., 247
U.S. 354, 365-66 (1918). CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 14 provides: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. .. ."
35 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 570 (1897), quoting Chesapeake & 0.
Canal Co. v. Key, 5 Fed. Cas. 563, (No. 2,649) (C.C.D.C. 1829). (Emphasis
added).
36 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855,
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Clearly, where the landowner suffers no loss in value, a rule that
forces the condemnor to pay double compensation upsets this "balance"
and violates the policy of the constitutional provisions.8 7
Although it has never been directly raised as an issue in a Cal-
ifornia case,38 some public condemnors have taken the position that
the constitution establishes not only the minimum requirements of
the amount of the landowner's recovery, but the maximum require-
ments of the amount of the state's payments.,9 Any statute requiring
excess compensation would, by this analysis, be "unjust" to the state
and, therefore, violate the policy of the constitution.
Both equitably and constitutionally the special benefits that ex-
ceed severance damage should be offset against compensation for the
take. If this were done in California, the total cost of each project
would be reduced,40 producing a financial surplus that is not now
available. This surplus could then be used to create more projects.
With the attendant general benefit that each new project produces,
the landowner would benefit along with the general public, albeit not
as dramatically as he profits under the present system.
Inconsistency
In computing compensation where water rights are taken, section
1248.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure 41 allows the offsetting of benefits
against the total damage incurred. Section 1248 of the Code of Civil
Procedure delineates the California rule limiting the offsetting of
861, 357 P.2d 451, 455, 9 Cal. Rptr. 363, 367 (1960); Bacich v. Board of Control,
23 Cal. 2d 343, 350-51, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
37 Yager, Just Compensation, RIGHT OF WAY, Dec. 1964, at 21-22.
88 Yager, Just Compensation, RIGHT OF WAY, Dec. 1964, at 21. But see
Contra Costa County Water Dist. v. Zuckerman Const. Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d
908, 50 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1966); People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v.
Fair, 229 Cal. App. 2d 801, 808, 40 Cal. Rptr. 644, 649 (1964) (the court said
there were "very interesting constitutional questions regarding the interpre-
tation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1248.").
39 See generally Contra Costa County Water Dist. v. Zuckerman Const.
Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 908, 50 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1966); People ex rel. Department
of Pub. Works v. Fair, 229 Cal. App. 2d 801, 40 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1964).
40 See generally Haar & Hering, The Determination of Benefits in Land
Acquisition, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 833 (1963).
41 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248(4) provides: "If the property sought to
be condemned be water or the use of water, belonging to riparian owners, or
appurtenant to any lands, how much the lands of the riparian owner, or the
lands to which the property sought to be condemned is appurtenant, will be
benefited, if at all, by a diversion of water from its natural course, by the
construction and maintenance, by the person or corporation in whose favor
the right of eminent domain is exercised, of works for the distribution and
convenient delivery of water upon said lands; and such benefit, if any, shall
be deducted from any damages awarded the owner of such property."
(Emphasis added).
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special benefits to severance damage in the condemnation of land.
42
There is no justification for a distinction between compensation for
water rights and compensation for land. In both situations the owner
must be given just compensation for his loss. 43 In both cases there is
loss due to the taking, damage to the remaining rights because of such
taking, and some benefit to be offset.44 It is inconsistent to limit
the offsetting of benefits to severance damages in the taking of one
form of property right, but to allow the offsetting of benefits against
all damage in the taking of another form of property right. Although
all the leading commentators 45 have pointed out the logical inconsist-
ency of limiting the benefits to severance damage, California continues
this rule where there is a partial taking of land.
Simplicity
The federal rule is simpler to apply and to understand than the
California rule. Under the California rule the jury must separately
value the part taken, the severance damage and the benefit.46  This
process obscures the real issue-whether the owner has suffered any
loss of value-and is an artificial and inadequate method of arriving
at the true loss. In a partial taking situation, the portion taken by
the condemnor is normally never sold because there is no true market
for a 50x10' frontage along a road, or for an irrigation canal right-of-
way. The valuation of the portion taken, therefore, is a fiction.47
A separate measurement of severance damage also complicates the
process of ascertaining the owner's compensable loss. Severance dam-
age is the loss in value that the remaining land suffers in comparison
with the pre-condemnation value of that land as a part of the whole
tract.48 Here, too, the jury must attempt to compare values that, due
to the absence of any market or base for such comparative damage,
are never accurately established.
The federal rule avoids such inaccuracies by placing a value upon
the total land prior to the taking, and upon the remainder of the land
after the taking. These are real, not artificial, values since such par-
cels could be sold and do, therefore, have true market values. It is
the value of the remaining land that includes the factor of special
benefit, for the special benefit will create a present, real and estimable
increase in the fair market value of this remaining land. Without
having to fragment the elements of damage into artificial units,
42 See note 2 supra.
43 See Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554, 2 P.2d 790 (1931); Crum
v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., 117 Cal. App. 586, 4 P.2d 564 (1931).
44 Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554, 2 P.2d 790 (1931); Crum v.
Mount Shasta Power Corp., 117 Cal. App. 586, 4 P.2d 564 (1931).
45 See note 23 supra.
46 See note 2 supra. See also People ex Tel. Department of Pub. Works v.
Anderson, 236 Cal. App. 2d 683, 695-96, 46 Cal. Rptr. 377, 386 (1965).
47 See Commonwealth v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844, 852-53 (Ky. 1963).
48 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943).
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the jury, by comparing the before and after values, can quickly and
simply determine the extent of the real loss to the owner from the
condemnation. 49
Summary
In a partial taking by condemnation, the "just" compensation
limitation requires that any special benefit to the remaining land be
offset against all damage inflicted by the condemnor. However, in
California, this is not done. Instead, the determination of just compen-
sation is complicated by fragmenting the total damage into two ele-
ments.50 In land acquisitions, the offsetting of benefits is then illogi-
cally limited to severance damage. The result is that in those situa-
tions where benefits exceed severance damage, the landowner re-
ceives an inequitable and unconstitutional double compensation.
By contrast, the simpler federal rule properly offsets both damage
and benefit by comparing the values of the land before and after the
condemnation. Where the after value-which includes the value of
special benefits as measured by fair market value-is equal to or
greater than the before value, no monetary compensation is awarded
the landowner. California, while initially holding the federal view,51
overreacted in favor of the landowner.52 It must return to the federal
rule if its law of benefits is to conform with logic, equity and consti-
tutional policy.
Weston L. Johnson*
49 See generally Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); United States v.
2477.79 Acres of Land, 259 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1958); L. ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 65 (2d ed. 1953); Haar & Hering,
The Determination of Benefits in Land Acquisition, 51 CALF. L. REv. 833,
868 (1963).
50 CAL. CODE CwV. PROC. § 1248.
51 San Francisco, A. & S. R.R. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 368 (1866).
52 Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902).
* Member, Third Year Class.
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